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Abstract
The recent ﬁnancial crisis deeply affected the money market yield curve and thus, potentially,
the proper functioning of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. There-
fore, we analyzethe effectivenessof monetarypolicyin steeringeuroarea moneymarketrates
using two measures: ﬁrst, the predictability of money market rates on the basis of monetary
policy expectations, and second the impact of extraordinary central bank measures on money
market rates. We ﬁnd that market expectations about monetary policy are less relevant for
money market rates up to 12 months after August 2007 compared to the pre-crisis period. At
the same time, our results indicate that the ECB’s net increase in outstanding open market
operations as of October 2008 accounts for at least a 100 basis point decline in Euribor rates.
These ﬁndings show that central banks have effective tools at hand to conduct monetary pol-
icy in times of crises.
Keywords: Monetary transmission mechanism; Financial Crisis; Monetary policy implemen-
tation; European Central Bank; Money market
JEL classiﬁcation: E43, E52, E585
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Non-technical Summary
The ﬁnancial crisis starting in August 2007 has deeply affected ﬁnancial markets around the world.
In particular, money markets contracted substantially leading to severe disruptions in banks’ short-
term funding. Interest rates in the unsecured segment of the money market rose to unprecedented
levels reﬂecting banks’ re-assessment of borrower’s creditworthiness and their willingness and
capacity to lend. And, hence, leading to a tightening of credit standards for both businesses and
households. These developments have called into question whether monetary policy can effec-
tively steer short term money market rates in such an environment.
In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy in steering money
market rates during the recent ﬁnancial crisis based on two aspects. First, we explore whether
markets’ interest rate expectations are adequately reﬂected in the shape of the money market yield
curve. Given the bank-centered structure of the euro area ﬁnancial system, this relationship is
crucial since interest rates, in particular the unsecured money market rates (Euribor), determine
short-term bank loans and deposit rates which in turn affect ﬁnancing conditions for households
and businesses. Second, we analyze the extent to which the ECB’s crisis related (non-standard)
monetary policy measures have been effective in reducing money market rates.
To that aim, we focus on the daily dynamics of the three-month, six-month and twelve-month
Euribor during the period March 2004 through June 2009. Along the lines of the expectation hy-
pothesis, we study the interaction of monetary policy and the term structure before and during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis. For the period before August 2007, we ﬁnd that Euribor rates up to twelve
months were signiﬁcantly in line with market’s expectations. According to our results, an ex-
pected policy rate change of 25 basis points causes the contemporaneous three-month, six-month,
and twelve-month Euribor to rise by 17, 19 and 23 basis points, respectively. After the outbreak
of the crisis, however, our results differ from those obtained for the pre-crisis period in two impor-
tant aspects. First, the yield curve reﬂects monetary policy intentions less clearly. An anticipated
policy rate change of 25 basis points is now accompanied by a contemporaneous increase in three-
month, six-month, and twelve-month Euribor rates by roughly 3 basis points. This implies that
during the crisis the management of market’s expectations became rather difﬁcult. This challenges
the proper functioning of the interest rate channel and thus the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Second, the Euribor rates became highly persistent. Therefore, a lasting impact of shocks may
have impeded the transparency of policy signals and the central bank’s impact on money market
rates. At the same time, our results suggest that the use of the crisis-related (non-standard) mone-6
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tary policy measures by the ECB has contributed to a decline in money market rates. In particular,
the net increase of outstanding volumes associated with open market operations shows to account
for a reduction in Euribor rates by more than 100 basis points.7
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1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis starting in August 2007 deeply affected ﬁnancial markets around the world. In
particular, money markets contracted substantially leading to severe disruptions in banks’ short-
term funding. Unsecured money market rates rose to unprecedented levels reﬂecting banks’ re-
assessment of borrower’s creditworthiness and their willingness and capacity to lend. And, hence,
leading to a tightening of credit standards for both businesses and households, see European Cen-
tral Bank (2007b). These developments have called into question whether monetary policy can
effectively steer short term money market rates in such an environment. This paper investigates
the effectiveness of monetary policy with regard to the steering of money market rates during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis using two measures: ﬁrst, the predictability of money market rates on the
basis of monetary policy expectations reﬂecting the standard channel of monetary policy transmis-
sion. And second, the impact of the ECB’s crisis-related (non-standard) monetary policy measures
on money market rates.
The euro area ﬁnancial system has a bank-centered structure and as such, unsecured money
market rates determine short-term bank loans and deposit rates and thereby ﬁnancing conditions
for households and businesses. The euro interbank offered rate (Euribor), in that respect, is the
standard reference rate for the unsecured money market and serves as the benchmark for the pric-
ing of ﬁxed-income securities throughout the economy. Moreover, short-term retail bank interest
rates are priced in relation to the Euribor, and mortgage rates are often even indexed to it, see
de Bondt et al. (2005), Sorensen and Werner (2006). Therefore, the prevailing Euribor rates ap-
pear to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the effectiveness of monetary policy and the functioning of the
transmission mechanism in the euro area.
According to the expectation hypothesis, the current structure of Euribor rates should contain
an implicit path of the expected future short term interest rate, i.e. the policy rate set by the central
bank, see e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1991), and Rudebusch (1995). This path reﬂects how interest
rates will evolve over time and will change if new information about the economic outlook and
monetary policy necessitate a revision of the path. Hence, for an effective monetary policy, it is
therefore crucial that interest rate expectations are in line with the central bank policy intentions
and are correctly reﬂected in the shape of the yield curve.
Since the beginning of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, however, Euribor rates at various horizons
rose substantially and remained at elevated levels putting the clarity with which monetary policy
intentions are reﬂected in the shape of the yield curve at risk. To revive conditions in the money8
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market, the ECB, like many other central banks, mainly reacted by increasing signiﬁcantly the
liquidity provision to the banking sector via its open market operations. More precisely, until Oc-
tober 2008 the ECBrearranged its allotment pattern in its main reﬁnancing operations (MROs) and
extended its liquidity provision in size and frequency through supplementary longer term reﬁnanc-
ing operations (LTROs), albeit overall liquidity provision was kept more or less unchanged. After
October 2008, the ECB’s balance sheet grew considerably in size due to a number of extraordinary
measures including a ﬁxed rate unlimited liquidity provision, a further broadening of reﬁnancing
horizons and the establishment of a foreign currency funding facility, notably in U.S. dollars. If
these non-standard monetary policy measures were effective, they should lower the tensions in
money markets and contribute to a reduction of the marginal cost of funding bank loans, i.e. the
Euribor rates.
Following the rationale of the expectation hypothesis, we employ a model of the Euribor to
assess (i) its predictability on the basis of market’s monetary policy expectations at the three-
month, six-month and twelve-month horizon and (ii) the effectiveness of ECB’s crisis-related
(non-standard) monetary policy measures. Overall, our results indicate that during the recent
crisis, monetary policy has been largely effective. Before the ﬁnancial crisis, Euribor rates up to
12 months were signiﬁcantly in line with market’s expectations. Since the outbreak of the crisis,
however, the yield curve reﬂects monetary policy intentions less clearly. In addition, weﬁnd a high
persistence in Euribor rates that may have blurred the transparency of monetary policy further. In
contrast, the ECB’s crisis-related (non-standard) monetary policy measures were highly effective
in reducing Euribor rates. In fact, according to our estimates the signiﬁcant increase in the net
volume of outstanding open market operations as of October 2008 caused Euribor rates to decline
for more than 100 basis points.
The empirical literature has analyzed the transmission of monetary policy in the euro area
through various lenses. Most papers have focused on the effectiveness and relative importance
of different transmission channels over the cycle, see e.g. Chatelain et al. (2003), Ehrmann et al.
(2003), Peersman and Smets (2003)), whereas other contributions have studied the asymmetric
functioning of channels during upswings and downswings, see e.g. Bean et al. (2003), Ehrmann
and Worms (2004), Eickmeier et al. (2006). However, the effectiveness of monetary policy dur-
ing signiﬁcant crises, and especially during the recent ﬁnancial crisis has not been sufﬁciently
investigated yet.
Our paper is closely related to earlier work by Bernoth and von Hagen (2004) who analyze the
efﬁciency of the three-month Euribor for the period before 2004. Following Rudebusch (1995),9
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Rudebusch (1998) and Taylor (2001) we use interest rate expectations to assess the predictability
of monetary policy from an ex-post perspective. This paper also relates to recent work by the
Bank of England (2007), McAndrews et al. (2008), Taylor and Williams (2009), among others,
that discusses the risk premia components of elevated unsecured funding market rates after mid
2007. While Taylor and Williams (2009) associate the rise in risk premia predominantly to credit
risk factors, the common view acknowledges the existence of both credit and liquidity concerns.
However, when measuring these risk components (almost) all empirical studies implicitly assume
orthogonality among their risk proxies and decompose the premia into a credit risk and non-
credit risk part.1 We argue that this approach is inaccurate as the risk measures are shown to be
highly correlated and a partial regression-type decomposition of risk components yields to biased
estimators. Since imperfect multicollinearity tends to produce higher standard errors and thus
small t-values, this might even explain why e.g. Taylor and Williams (2009) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
evidence for liquidity risk in their results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of
recent developments in the euro money market and in the Eurosystem’s monetary policy regime.
In particular, it intends to clarify our deﬁnition of an effective monetary policy. Section 3 presents
our empirical model and discusses the variables that might determine the dynamic of Euribor rates.
In section 4, we present our empirical results. In section 5, we will conclude.
2 Monetary Policy and the Euro Money Market during the
Financial Crisis
There are different channels that are viewed to be essential for the effectiveness of monetary pol-
icy.2 A key feature to many of these mechanisms is that the entire expected path of interest rates
plays a crucial role in inﬂuencing the cost of lending to households and companies. Thus, an-
ticipated monetary policy is priced into the yield curve and affects in turn the level of economic
activity and price stability. Therefore, anchoring expectations enhances the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy infacilitating the transmission process, see Woodford (2003). Consequently, the central
1The only exception, to our knowledge, is Schwarz (2010) who uses the high frequency data from the
e-MID database to derive two orthogonal risk measures. However, this approach implicitly assumes that
the risk premia in Euribor rates may be completely assigned to liquidity and credit risk. However, it does
not control for volatility eﬀects of future expected overnight rates as well as market liquidity.
2For a detailed discussion of these transmission channels see e.g. Mishkin (1995) and Bean et al. (2003).
Boivin et al. (2010) review the core channels of policy transmission and provide new insights on how the
transmission mechanism might have evolved in recent decades.10
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bank’s degree of predictability of its actions is important for economic agents.
In the euro area, the overnight indexed swap (OIS) is the main instrument used by market
participants to take speculative positions on expected central bank actions. In general, European
money market rates followed expected short term rates very closely. In fact, in an environment
with sufﬁcient liquidity and no market dislocations the interest rate of term bank deposits ought
to bear a close relationship with the expectation of the compounded overnight rates over the same
horizon, as implied by the expectation hypothesis. For instance, the three-month (3M) euro inter-
bank offered rate (Euribor) has evolved in a close range to the respective 3M European OIS with
an average spread of around 8 basis points in the period before August 2007, see Figure A.1.3
Since the OIS is tied to the European overnight rate (Eonia), this spread stems from a premium
that banks pay when they borrow funds for a pre-determined period relative to the expected cost
that arises from repeatedly rolling over funding in the overnight market.4
In mid 2007 tensions surrounding assets backed by U.S. sub-prime mortgages started to spill
over into money markets around the world, leading to shortages of liquidity in money markets.
In the euro area, this resulted in an increased demand for liquidity. Combined with heightened
uncertainty, it caused (longer-term) money market rates in the unsecured segment increasingly to
dry up. In particular, the spread between the Euribor and the OIS rates at all maturities widened
signiﬁcantly suggesting that money market rates along the short end of the yield curve were di-
verging from their risk free counterparts, see Figure A.1. In order to re-stabilize conditions in the
money market, the European Central Bank (ECB) responded to the increased liquidity demand
by changing its allotment pattern in its main reﬁnancing operations (MROs) and extending its liq-
uidity provision in size and frequency through supplementary longer term reﬁnancing operations
(LTROs). More speciﬁcally, the ECB started to allot signiﬁcant excess liquidity at the beginning
of the maintenance period which was then gradually reabsorbed over the remaining weeks of the
period by reducing the allotment above the benchmark. This allowed counterparties to meet their
3Since money market transactions are carried out on a bilateral basis, they are notoriously hard to
obtain. Therefore, established reference rates such as the Euribor serve as the best (available) proxy for
actual transactions in the unsecured segment of the money market. See also www.euribor.org for further
details. Alternatively, one may use the Italian electronic trading platform e-Mid that accounts for 17 %
of all transactions in the shortest-maturity segment of the unsecured European money market. However,
since trades are executed in full transparency this platform will rather be used by ”good” banks. Thus,
data collected from e-Mid should not vary much, in particular in times of crises, from the Euribor rates
which themselves are based on a panel of prime banks with the highest credit standards in the euro area.
Please refer to Angelini et al. (2009) for an illustration of both data sources.
4More explicitly, the two arbitrage legs are: make a loan of e X for (say) three months and then fund
the loan by borrowing e X each day in the Eonia market and, ﬁnally, hedge the interest rate risk by
purchasing an OIS contract, see Gorton and Metrick (2009).11
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strong preferences of ”frontloading” liquidity at an early stage in the maintenance period. On
average, banks still continued to have a liquidity surplus close to zero at the end of each period
as before August 2007, see e.g. European Central Bank (2010). Additionally, to address the in-
creased liquidity demand in foreign currency the ECB established a dollar liquidity providing term
auction facility (TAF) through a swap with the US Federal Reserve Bank (Fed).
During the second half of 2008, when Lehman Brothers ﬁled for bankruptcy, banks became
even more reluctant to engage in interbank money market trading and correspondingly relied upon
the use of ECB’s reﬁnancing operations, see e.g. Cassola et al. (2009). The tensions in the euro
area money market intensiﬁed and Euribor rates diverged even further from their OIS counterparts,
see Figure A.1. On October 15, 2008 the ECB responded to the exacerbated crisis by a number of
extraordinary measures. More speciﬁcally, the ECB switched from the variable rate tender format
to a ﬁxed rate full allotment policy in order to satisfy the full liquidity demand of the banking
sector. Furthermore, the liquidity provision was extended to reﬁnancing operations with six and
twelve months of maturity. This increase in the net volume of outstanding open market operations
caused ECB’s balance sheet to grow substantially, see Figure A.3. The ECB took more explicit
steps to lower the cost of unsecured term borrowing and reduced its policy rates by 325 basis
points from 4.25% in October 2008 to 1.00% in May 2009. The provision of liquidity at the
policy rate and the commitment to continue these non-standard monetary policy measures for a
clearly deﬁned period could be interpreted as strong signals to keep rates low as long as needed.5
3 Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy
3.1 Modelling the Euribor Dynamics
The (weak) form of the expectation hypothesis of the term structure states, from a theoretical
perspective, the equality between current longer-term rates and the average expected overnight
rate plus a constant maturity speciﬁc risk premium, see e.g. Litterman et al. (1991) and Hamilton
and Kim(2002).6 Weuse thisrationale toapply the following model inorder tostudy thedynamics
of the Euribor rate (R):
5In fact, once policy rates approach levels closer to zero these measures are crucial in shaping the
market’s expectations about the future monetary policy stance, see e.g. Mishkin (2007).
6We consider the weak form of the expectation hypothesis to be the relevant form. The strong view
without a premia conﬂicts with the fact that yield curves normally slope up which would imply that
short-term rates are expected to trend upwards indeﬁnitely.12
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+ γ′CBt + δ′Xt +
X5
j=1 ϕj∆Rt−j(k) + ǫt (1)
where ∆ denotes the ﬁrst-difference operator. Our model is expressed in ﬁrst differences in
order to avoid potential issues of non-stationarity that we discuss in the Appendix. α captures the
relationship between the current longer-term rate of duration k and the average expected overnight
rate over the same horizon, 1
k
Pk−1
j=0 Et∆rt+1+j.7 The expectation hypothesis requires a theoret-
ical one-to-one relationship for it to hold, i.e. α = 1. We do not, however, seek to perform a
restricted model where we impose the expectation hypothesis on our estimation. In fact, in order
to investigate whether the link between Euribor rates and market’s monetary policy expectations
has changed during the crisis, we need to estimate α. In general, a coefﬁcient estimate of (statisti-
cally) less than one need not to point to a failure of the hypothesis, see Kuttner (2001). He argues
that changes in current longer-term rates on the day of a policy rate change announcement reﬂect
changes in the average expected overnight rates over the duration of the contract. Therefore, the
impact of a one-day surprise should be less than one-for-one, see Demiralp (2008) for empirical
evidence on the 3M Treasury Bill rate. Furthermore, Demiralp and Jorda (2004) show that many
one-day policy steps have to do with the timing of the action rather than with their ultimate size.
In normal times, the common approach in the expectation hypothesis literature is to treat
the (risk) premium as a time-invariant term that is only of negligible amount. Hence, in a ﬁrst-
difference representation, it is then assumed to be zero. In a ﬁnancial crisis, as recently witnessed,
the premium may not only be signiﬁcant in size but may also change substantially from one day
to another. To avoid the problem of omitted variable bias, we have therefore included a vector, Φ,
that comprises the various dimensions of risk: (i) (funding and market) liquidity risk, (ii) coun-
terparty risk and (iii) market risk.8 CB is a vector of measures related to ECB’s crisis-related
(non-standard) monetary policy measures undertaken to mitigate the strains in the money market.
We use this variable to investigate whether these measures managed to decrease Euribor rates.9
7For long-term interest rates beyond the 10 year horizon, the Jensen’s inequality term arises because
a log of an expectation does not equal the expectation of a log. At our maturities, however, this term is
rather negligible and hence needs no consideration in our analysis.
8Among the bank-speciﬁc variables, it is useful to distinguish between the compensation for the risk
of default and a premium related to the demand for funds, which depends upon the ease of funding by
borrowing (funding liquidity). Market-wide conditions include the uncertainty about the path of expected
overnight rates, which is reﬂected in a term premium, the ease of trading (market liquidity), and factors
related to the ﬁxing process and the microstructure of the market.
9Note, however, that this procedure is not suﬃcient to identify the causal eﬀects of central bank actions.13
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X reﬂects a vector of dummies controlling for calendar effects in the data.10 Along the lines of
Hassler and Nautz (2008) and Busch and Nautz (2010), controllability of money market rates re-
quires sufﬁciently low persistence in longer-term money market rates. If money market rates are
too persistent the lasting impact of shocks can impede the transparency of policy signals and the
central bank’s monetary policy inﬂuence on money market rates along the yield curve. Hence, we





In the euro area, the OIS market constitutes the most important derivative market. In general, it
serves as the main platform to manage short-term interest risk exposures and covers roughly 40%
of the overall OTC derivatives market, see e.g. European Central Bank (2007a). There are two
parties that are involved in a OIS contract out of which one commits to pay a ﬁxed rate (swap
rate) and one paying a variable rate (average Eonia over the maturity of the swap). The OISt(k)
rate can be interpreted as the average short-term rate that the market expects to prevail for the next




j=0 Et∆rt+1+j.12 Changes in the OIS rate would, thus, suggest revisions in
expectations of future overnight rates over the course of the correspondingly dated Euribor rate.
In other terms, for an effective monetary policy, α should be signiﬁcant and positively signed in
order for OIS rates to help to explain Euribor rates.13
3.2.2 Risk Measures
During the recent ﬁnancial crisis, there have been different forms of risk at play: liquidity risk
(Eisenschmidt and Tapking (2009)), credit risk (Taylor and Williams (2009)), and the combination
of liquidity and credit risk (Brunnermeier (2009), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Christensen
et al. (2009), Schwarz (2010), McAndrews et al. (2008)). In the attempt to derive an accurate
measure for each of the additive forms of risk, the following two approaches have been suggested.
Rather, it measures interest rate movements immediately after central bank actions.
10For instance, liquidity pressures in money markets may arise due to end-of-year window dressing of
balance sheets by ﬁnancial institutions.
11Since we use daily observations, a lag order of ﬁve days seems reasonable. This is also suggested by
the AIC information criteria.
12Refer to Carpenter and Demiralp (2009) for a similar approach applied to the U.S. market.
13Since March 2008, the announcement of OIS rates has changed from 4:30 p.m. CET to 11 a.m. CET.
In line with the ﬁxing of the Euribor, the deﬁnition of ∆OISt(k) is adjusted accordingly.14
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On the one hand, one may assume that the risk component in Euribor rates are fully explained
by (funding) liquidity and by a credit part. But this approach bears the problem associated with
omitted variable bias since volatility effects of future expected overnight rates as well as market
liquidity, in general, are completely ignored. To circumvent this, one may use on the other hand
a two step approach following the logic of the partitioned regression analysis. This would enable
a decomposition of risk premia into e.g. a credit and non-credit part. Such an approach implic-
itly assumes orthogonality between the risk factors. But as Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
and Brunnermeier (2009) argue, these risk factors mutually affect and even reinforce each other.
Therefore, (at least) one of the estimated coefﬁcients of the risk variables will be biased. This
is a consequence of misleadingly allocating the joint variation of the risk measures to one of the
decomposed risk elements. We will therefore suggest the following variables in order to avoid
these issues and capture the major risk parts in Euribor rates.
The (ﬁve-year, BBB rated) yield spread between ﬁnancial corporate and government bonds
will serve as our credit risk proxy. Bonds, in general, are debt securities generating identical cash
ﬂowsinall states ofthe world. Corporate bonds are issued by companies as away ofraising money
to invest in their business. They have nominal value which is the amount that will be returned to
the investor on a stated future date (the redemption date). This pays a (usually) ﬁxed interest rate
each year. Government bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of the ﬁscal authority. Hence,
a ﬁnancial corporate bond normally bears a default risk and hence carries higher interest rates than
a government bond. The spread is therefore a natural proxy for credit risk.14 Higher values of this
variable should lead to an increase in Euribor rates.
Asourliquidity risk proxy, wewillusethe spread between therate forfully collateralized loans
(Eurepo GC) in the money market and the risk-free OIS rate. Repurchase agreements between
banks backed by government (guaranteed) bonds and bills are a form of secured lending.15 In
contrast to a swap agreement, in a collateralized transaction liquidity changes hands and therefore
the lending party requires a liquidity premium that depends upon the duration of the loan. Thus,
the Eurepo-OIS spread, or the expectations-adjusted Eurepo rate, can be considered as a reliable
liquidity risk proxy.16 And a rise in the spread should put an upward pressure of Euribor rates.
14We may use CDS spreads instead as commonly applied. However, it is not clear whether CDS spreads
reﬂect a faire probability of default. For instance, in 2008 hedge funds in Iceland engaged in CDS contracts
to speculated on sovereign and corporate default.
15Loans at the Eurepo have strict requirements on the type and quality of the collateral. For a list of
eligible collateral, see http://www.eurepo.org
16We are aware of the fact that concerns about the delivery or return of the collateral may be priced in
Eurepo rates. Furthermore, in a strict sense OIS rates are not risk-free as one of the involved parties may15
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We use the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) in order to account for
implied future volatility in the stock market. VIX is a weighted average of implied volatilities
of a wide range of Standard and Poor’s 500 index (put and call) options. It reﬂects market’s
expectation of volatility over the next 30 days period and is often referred to as the ”investor fear
gauge”. In addition, since the VIX captures (expected) adverse price changes of market valued
assets, it thereby reﬂects (at least indirectly) changes in market liquidity as well. As presented in
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), when funding liquidity dries up in an environment of market
stress, margins will be recalled and that in turn will affect asset prices as they will drop due to
ﬁre sales. As a result, market liquidity will dry up too. High values of VIX point to a greater
uncertainty in the stock market that should put an upward pressure on Euribor rates.
3.2.3 Central Bank Measures
As part of its weekly ﬁnancial statement, the ECB announces its net lending associated with its
monetary policy operations to credit institutions. The outstanding volumes of both the MROs
and all LTROs are therefore a natural variable representing the size of the ECB’s liquidity provi-
sion. While the ECB’s open market operations do not have a direct impact on money and credit
aggregates, they may have affected monetary developments indirectly through their impact on
short-term money market rates and the pass-through of these rates to bank lending and deposit
rates. Such indirect effects, which work through the opportunity cost of holding money and the
cost of external ﬁnancing, reﬂect demand by households and ﬁrms for money and bank credit. In
general, more liquidity supply should affect interest rates.
In pre-crisis times, MROs should not affect Euribor rates since the ECB’s liquidity manage-
ment is performed so as to allow banks to fulﬁll their reserve requirements during the reserve
maintenance period which is usually 4 to 5 weeks. LTROs should have no impact on the Euri-
bor before August 2007 whatsoever since these operations were conducted as variable rate tender
without a minimum bid rate. Hence, the ECB acted as a price taker and pre-announced the liq-
uidity amount that it deemed appropriate to allot. Alternatively, one may argue that MROs and
LTROs aimed to satisfy neutral conditions before August 2007 while after mid 2007, MROs and
LTROs became a policy instrument to steer interest rates.
In any case, if the wide range of crisis-related (non-standard) monetary policy measures un-
default and the remaining party is subject to the diﬀerential in the ﬁxed and overnight components of the
swap.16
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dertaken by the ECB as of August 2007 were effective in lowering the strains in the money market,
we would expect a reduction in Euribor rates through the increase in net volume of outstanding
open market operations. To examine the effect of the US dollar liquidity provision through a swap
with the U.S. Fed, we deﬁne a dummy variable as follows.17 The indicator denoted by DTAF = 1
on a day of any term auction facility (TAF) operation and zero on other days.
Furthermore, we control for the announcement effect of each operation since news releases
can change prices themselves. Regular MROs and LTROs are announced in an annual indicative
calendar three months before the year for which it is valid. Therefore, we will only consider
announcement effects related to supplementary reﬁnancing operations (sLTRO) during the crisis
period. Hence, Dan
sLTRO = 1 for all days on which a sLTRO was announced and zero otherwise.
In the same vein, we deﬁne Dan
TAF = 1 for all announcement days of TAF operations and zero
otherwise.18 If the undertaken measures have been effective in reducing elevated money market
rates, the expected signs of the coefﬁcients are negative.
3.3 Data
We use daily data from March 2004 to June 2009 to estimate equation (1) for the 3M, 6M and 12M
Euribor. Prior to March 2004, banks had difﬁculties to assess the ECB’s allotment policy. Banks
had to carry out complex still not accurate calculations in order to determine ECB’s benchmark
allotment. This uncertainty about ECB’s behavior caused uncertainty regarding money market
rates and thus the pricing of risk premia along the yield curve, see e.g. Jardet and Fol (2007). From
March 2004 onwards, the ECB facilitated counterparties’ anticipation of its liquidity allotment in
the MROsby publishing its calculation of the benchmark allotment.19 Toensure that our dynamics
in Euribor rates are not affected by bank’s uncertainty about ECB’s allotment stance, we will start
17Taylor and Williams (2009) and McAndrews et al. (2008) apply a similar technique for the federal
funds and U.S. Libor market. Note that for this analysis, modeling our equation of the Euribor in ﬁrst
diﬀerences is the most appropriate approach. A level representation would implicitly assume that the
(liquidity) risk premium that might fall on a day of ECB’s operation will revert to the previous level
immediately after the operation. However, if the liquidity premium remains at the lower level over many
days after an operation, the estimated coeﬃcient of the event cannot be interpreted as a central bank eﬀect
and it would likely appear insigniﬁcant.
18On February 1, 2008 the ECB announced that it would not participate in the February US dollar
liquidity providing operations. Therefore, we deﬁne D
an
TAF = −1 for that special date since this announce-
ment might have reduced the anticipated supply of liquidity in the TAFs and thereby might have put an
upward pressure on money market rates.
19The benchmark allotment is the allotment normally required to establish balanced conditions in the
short-term money market, given the ECB’s complete liquidity forecast. Balanced liquidity conditions
should normally result in an overnight rate close to the policy rate. The benchmark allotment constitutes
a baseline for the ECB when making its actual allotment decision, see European Central Bank (2004).17
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our sample with the ﬁrst maintenance period after ECB’s operational framework revision on 10
March, 2004.
In order to account for the changes in risk premia and in the demand and supply of liquidity, we
allow money market rates to respond differently to its determinants after August 2007. Therefore,
we explore the Euribor dynamics for the crisis and pre-crisis sample separately. In fact, splitting
our sample on August 9, 2007 is also implied by structural breakpoint tests, see Section D in the
Appendix. This leaves us with 802 and 424 observation for the period 10 March 2004 - 8 August
2007 (pre-crisis) and 9 August 2007 - 30 June 2009 (crisis), respectively. Table 1 summarizes the
estimation results for our model of the 3M, 6M and 12M Euribor.
4 The Eﬀectiveness of Monetary Policy: Empirical Results
4.1 Before the Crisis
For all our maturities, α is plausibly signed and highly signiﬁcant. This suggests that, all other
things being equal, an expected change in the policy rate produces a shift in the yield curve, at least
at the short end. If markets expect short-term rates to rise in the near future, there is a proportional
increase in Euribor rates. According to our results, an expected policy rate change of 25 basis
points will cause the 3M, 6M and 12M Euribor rate to rise immediately by 17, 19 and 23 basis
points, respectively.20 This result strongly supports the relevance of market’s monetary policy
expectations for longer-term money market rates.
Our results also show that risk premia determine euro unsecured money market rates in a sig-
niﬁcant way. Both credit risk and liquidity risk considerations increase with maturity. In absolute
terms, the major component of the risk premia in Euribor rates can be assigned to (funding) liquid-
ity risk. Changes in the expectation-adjusted GC Eurepo rate by 10 basis points will be followed
by upward movements in the 3M, 6M and 12M Euribor rate by roughly 6, 8, and 9 basis points,
respectively.21
20Note that we relaxed the the assumption of the constant premia. Hence, the expectation hypothesis
no longer attributes all changes in the yield curve solely to changes in expected short rates.
21The Wald test of parameter equality (not reported) cannot reject the null hypothesis H0 : α = β2.
Since ∆Eurepo = ∆OIS + ∆(Eurepo − OIS), equation (1) is a re-parametrization of the representation
which includes both the relationships between market expectations and Euribor rates and the secured vs.
unsecured money market rates, i.e. ∆OIS and ∆Eurepo. This close connection has been reported by
Taylor and Williams (2009) for U.S. equivalents.18
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Given the high correlation (0.47) between the yield spread of corporate and government bonds
and the VIX, our respective data set provides little information about what happens to Euribor rates
when credit risk concerns are low but VIX is high, or vice versa. In fact, the weak power to reject
the null of non-signiﬁcance is very likely to be due to the issue associated with imperfect multi-
collinearity: high correlation between the regressors leads to large variance of the OLS estimator
that in turn causes small t-values.22 The F-tests of joint signiﬁcance (see B.1 in the Appendix)
show clearly that there is a signiﬁcant joint impact stemming from these risk measures. This result
supports our approach to include a set of risk variables into our estimation that otherwise would
suffer from the problem of omitted variable bias. However, our OLS estimators remain unbiased
and the overall ﬁt is not affected.
In line with our hypotheses, there is no particular effect from the Eurosystem’s open market
operations on money markets during tranquil times. This is intuitive since the liquidity amount to
be allotted in ECB’s LTROs has always been pre-announced. The low persistence in Euribor rates
before mid 2007 highlight the ECB’s stable control over longer-term money market rates.
4.2 During the Crisis
For the period after the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, we present our empirical results of the Euribor
equation in the second column of each maturity horizon in Table 1. At ﬁrst sight, the results differ
from those obtained for the pre-crisis period in two important aspects.
First, according to the large and signiﬁcant estimates of ϕj Euribor rates became severely
persistent. In fact, we observe a threefold increase in persistence for the 3M rates, a 10-fold
increase for 6M rates, and a 45-fold rise in 12M rates. Second, the predictability of Euribor rates
on the basis of market expectations of future overnight rates has diminished quite signiﬁcantly.
An anticipated policy rate change of 25 basis points is now accompanied by a contemporaneous
increase of the 3M, 6M, and 12M Euribor rate by roughly 3 basis points. In addition to these short-
term effects, our estimates also suggest a change in the long-run dynamics during the period after
mid 2007. For instance, while the long-term effects of market’s expectations on the 3M, 6M, and
12M Euribor before the crisis amounted to 0.80, 0.83, and 0.92, respectively, the coefﬁcients were
22To see this eﬀect we consider the variance of ˆ β1 in a multiple regression setup with two regressors (X1
and X2) for the simple case of a homoskedastic error. In large samples, the sampling distribution of ˆ β1 is
N(β1,σ
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X1,X2 is the correlation between X1 and X2.20
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roughly 0.33, 0.30, and 0.31, respectively, after August 2007.23 Hence, the higher persistence and
the related more lasting impact of shocks may have contributed to the increase in the marginal
cost of funding bank loans in the interbank market. Moreover, this greater persistency in money
market rates also implies that it is more difﬁcult for monetary policy signals to be transmitted
through money market rates along the yield curve via conventional channels of monetary policy.
Following Table B.1, during the crisis liquidity risk and credit risk concerns have become
severely correlated. This stylized fact is consistent with the general view that liquidity and credit
risk cannot be separated as both measures mutually affect each other, see e.g. Sarkar (2009) and
the references therein. Hence, it remains difﬁcult to interpret the coefﬁcients b β1, b β2, and b β3.
The F-statistic, however, implies that there is a signiﬁcant join impact stemming from the risk
measures.
Table 2: Wald tests on parameter equality
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Notes: Wald statistics refer to the estimated coeﬃcients in Table1. p-values are
presented in parentheses.
Probably reﬂecting the decreasing ability to manage expectations properly, the estimated rep-
resentation of the Euribor rates indicates a growing importance of the reﬁnancing volumes allotted
in the MROs and LTROs. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis H0 : γ1 = γ2, see Ta-
ble 2. Hence, the ECB’s liquidity provision may only lower Euribor rates when the net volume
of outstanding open market operations changes signiﬁcantly. Recall that until October 2008, even
though the ECB rearranged the pattern and shares of MROs and LTROs in the total volume of
23The fact that there is a diﬀerence between short-term and long-term coeﬃcients is a result of our
speciﬁcation which includes lagged endogenous variables. To illustrate this, let us consider our model in
the following general representation: yt = c +
Pp
j=1 ϕjyt−j + θ
′Xt + ǫt, where ǫt is an iid shock and Xt a
vector of exogenous variables. Supposing that E(yt) and E(Xt) are constant over time, our model can be
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outstanding open market operations, the net volume has not increased, on average, compared to
the pre-crisis period, remaining at around e 450 billion. In the sum, the effects from the changes
in the shares of MROs and LTROs (from 70% and 30% before 2007 to roughly 30% and 70%
after 2007) may not have brought down Euribor rates. However, one may also argue that the
rearrangement of the liquidity provision has established (some degree of) conﬁdence that might
have prevented Euribor rates from rising further, see e.g. Mishkin (2009). After October 2008,
however, when the ECB introduced a ﬁxed rate full allotment policy, i.e. every bank obtained
what it demanded, the volume of outstanding reﬁnancing operations increased signiﬁcantly and
peaked even to levels of around e 890 billion, see Figure A.3. In total, the aggregate amount of
outstanding open market operation rose, on average, by more than 60% during our sample period.
According to our estimates of b γ1 and b γ2, this implies a reduction of Euribor rates by more than
100 basis points. This ﬁnding provides strong evidence for the effectiveness of monetary policy
in alleviating the strains in money market rates along the short-end of the yield curve. In addition,
we ﬁnd that the announcement of supplementary LTROs with 3M maturity had a plausible sign.
However, the effect appears to be weakly signiﬁcant only for the 3M and 6M horizon. Note that
the announcement of one year LTROs diminished 12M Euribor rates further. While the introduc-
tion of TAF operations has helped to reduce 12M Euribor rates, Table 1 shows that the U.S. dollar
provision had no mitigating effect at the 3M and 6M horizon, neither the actual operations nor the
announcements.
5 Conclusion
The ECB implements its monetary policy by steering the very short-term money market rate,
i.e. the Eonia. In normal times, it is thereby able to inﬂuence the term money market rate, i.e.
Euribor, that in turn determine short-term interest rates for retail bank loan and deposit rates. Since
the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis in August 2007, however, euro money market rates have been
severely impaired causing Euribor rates to rise to unprecedented levels. In this paper we have
analyzed whether these developments have compromised the effectiveness of monetary policy in
steering money market rates. Towards this aim, we have looked at two criteria. First, how well
have monetary policy expectations been reﬂected in the money market yield curve and second,
how has the ECB’s crisis related (non-conventional) monetary policy measures affected money
market rates of three-month, six-month and twelve-month maturity.
We found that as in the ﬁnancial crisis money market rates have been heavily impacted by22
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risk concerns, the ability of the central bank to steer money market rates via standard channels
of monetary policy transmission was weakened. We show that the reﬂection of monetary policy
expectations in Euribor rates has declined substantially. At the same time, however, our results
indicate that the ECB’s crisis-related (non-standard) monetary policy measures have proven to be
effective in reducing money market rates.
We conclude that part of the loss in the effectiveness of monetary policy during the ﬁnancial
crisis via the traditional interest rate channel was compensated by the effective use of liquidity
operations affecting money market rates beyond the daily maturity. In fact, before the crisis mon-
etary policy operations were neutral with respect to the monetary policy stance, i.e. they did not
affect money market rates at longer term maturities. During the ﬁnancial crisis, however, the sig-
niﬁcant expansion of the central bank balance sheet and the conduct of ﬁxed rate tenders with full
allotment have exerted a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the dynamics of money market rates at three-
month, six-month, and twelve-month maturities. In particular, our results indicate that the ECB’s
net increase in outstanding open market operations as of October 2008 accounts for at least a 100
basis point decline in Euribor rates. Therefore, overall, our results clearly show that central banks
indeed have adequate tools at their disposal to conduct effective monetary policy, also in times of
crises.23
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1328
April 2011
References
Angelini, P., A. Nobili and M.C. Picillo (2009): The interbank market after August 2007: what
has changed, and why?, Economic Working Papers No. 731, Bank of Italy.
Bank of England (2007): An Indicative Decomposition of Libor Spreads, Quarterly Bulletin No.
Q4.
Bean, C., J.D. Larsen and K. Nikolov (2003): Financial Frictions and the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism: Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications, in: I. Angeloni, A. Kashyap, and
B. Mojon (Eds.), Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 107–130.
Bernoth, K. and J. von Hagen (2004): The Euribor Futures Market: Efﬁciency and the Impact of
ECB Policy Announcements, International Finance, 7(1), 1–24.
Boivin, J., M.T. Kiley and F.S. Mishkin (2010): How Has the Monetary Transmission Mecha-
nism Evolved Over Time?, NBER Working Papers No. 15879, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
Brunnermeier, M.K. (2009): Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 23(1), 77–100.
Brunnermeier, M.K. and L.H. Pedersen (2009): Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, Review
of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2201–2238.
Busch, U. and D. Nautz (2010): Controllability and Persistence of Money Market Rates along the
Yield Curve: Evidence from the Euro Area, German Economic Review, 11(3), 367–380.
Campbell, J.Y. and R.J. Shiller (1991): Yield Spreads and Interest Rate Movements: A Bird’s Eye
View, Review of Economic Studies, 58(3), 495–514.
Carpenter, S. and S. Demiralp (2009): Money and the Transmission of Monetary Policy,
T¨ US´ YAD-Koc ¸ University Economic Research Forum Working Papers No. 0906, TUSIAD-Koc
University Economic Research Forum.
Cassola, N., A. Hortacsu and J. Kastl (2009): The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens
of European Central Bank Auctions for Short-Term Funds, Working Paper No. 15158, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Chatelain, J.B., A. Generale, I. Hernando, P. Vermeulen and U.V. Kalckreuth (2003): New Find-
ings on Firm Investment and Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area, Oxford Review
of Economic Policy, 19(1), 73–83.
Christensen, J.H.E., J.A. Lopez and G.D. Rudebusch (2009): Do central bank liquidity facilities
affect interbank lending rates?, Working Paper Series No. 2009-13, Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco.
de Bondt, G., B. Mojon and N. Valla (2005): Term Structure and the Sluggishness of Retail Bank
Interest Rates in Euro Area Countries, Working Paper Series No. 518, European Central Bank.
Demiralp, S. (2008): Monetary policy surprises and the expectations hypothesis at the short end
of the yield curve, Economics Letters, 101(1), 1–3.24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1328
April 2011
Demiralp, S. and O. Jorda (2004): The Response of Term Rates to Fed Announcements, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 36(3), 387–405.
Ehrmann, M., L. Gambacorta, J. Martinez-Pag` Es, P. Sevestre and A. Worms (2003): The Effects
of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(1), 58–72.
Ehrmann, M. and A. Worms (2004): Bank Networks and Monetary Policy Transmission, Journal
of the European Economic Association, 2(6), 1148–1171.
Eickmeier, S., B. Hofmann and A. Worms (2006): Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Bank Lend-
ing: Evidence for Germany and the Euro Area, Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies
No. 2006,34, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
Eisenschmidt, J. and J. Tapking (2009): Liquidity risk premia in unsecured interbank money
markets, Working Paper Series No. 1025, European Central Bank.
European Central Bank (2004): Publication of the Benchmark Allotment in the Main Reﬁnancing
Operations, Monthly Bulletin, April.
European Central Bank (2007a): Euro Money Market Study 2006.
European Central Bank (2007b): Evidence of the Impact of Recent Financial Market Tensions,
as revealed by Bank Lending Surveys in Major Industrialised Economies, Monthly Bulletin,
December.
European Central Bank (2010): The ECB’s Monetary Policy Stance During the Financial Crisis,
Monthly Bulletin, January.
Gorton, G.B. and A. Metrick (2009): Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, NBER Working
Papers No. 15223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Hamilton, J.D. and D.H. Kim (2002): A Reexamination of the Predictability of Economic Activity
Using the Yield Spread, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 34(2), 340–360.
Hassler, U. and D. Nautz (2008): On the Persistence of the Eonia Spread, Economics Letters,
101(3), 184–187.
Jardet, C. and G.L. Fol (2007): Euro money market interest rates dynamics and volatility: How
they respond to recent changes in the operational framework, Documents de Travail No. 167,
Banque de France.
Kuttner, K.N. (2001): Monetary Policy Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence from the Fed Funds
Futures Market, Journal of Monetary Economics, 47(3), 523–544.
Litterman, R.B., J. Scheinkman and L. Weiss (1991): Volatility and the Yield Curve, Journal of
Fixed Income, 1(1), 49–53.
McAndrews, J., A. Sarkar and Z. Wang (2008, July): The Effect of the Term Auction Facility on
the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports (335).
Mishkin, F.S. (1995): Symposium on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism, Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 9(4), 3–10.25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1328
April 2011
Mishkin, F.S. (2007): Inﬂation Dynamics, International Finance, 10(3), 317–334.
Mishkin, F.S. (2009): Is Monetary Policy Effective during Financial Crises?, American Economic
Review, 99(2), 573–77.
Newey, W.K. and K.D. West (1987): A Simple, Positive Semi-Deﬁnite, Heteroskedasticity and
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix, Econometrica, 55(3), 703–708.
Peersman, G. and F. Smets (2003): The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the Euro Area:
More Evidence from VAR Analysis, in: I. Angeloni, A. Kashyap, and B. Mojon (Eds.), Mon-
etary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.
36–55.
Rudebusch, G.D. (1995): Federal Reserve Interest Rate Targeting, Rational Expectations, and the
Term Structure, Journal of Monetary Economics, 35, 245–274.
Rudebusch, G.D. (1998): Monetary Policy and the Term Structure of Interest Rates: An Overview
of Some Recent Research, in: I. Angeloni and R. Rovelli (Eds.), Monetary Policy and the Term
Structure of Interest Rates, New York, USA: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 263–271.
Sarkar, A. (2009): Liquidity Risk, Credit Risk, and the Federal Reserve’s Responses to the Crisis,
Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 23(4), 335–348.
Schwarz, K. (2010): Mind the Gap: Disentangling Credit and Liquidity in Risk Spreads, Working
Paper Series, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Sorensen, C.K. and T. Werner (2006): Bank Interest Rate Pass-Through in the Euro Area: a Cross
Country Comparison, Working Paper Series No. 580, European Central Bank.
Taylor, A.M. (2001): Potential Pitfalls for the Purchasing-Power-Parity Puzzle? Sampling and
Speciﬁcation Biases in Mean-Reversion Tests of the Law of One Price, Econometrica, 69(2),
473–498.
Taylor, J.B. and J.C. Williams (2009): A Black Swan in the Money Market, American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1), 58–83.
Woodford, M. (2003): Interest and Prices, princeton university press, princeton, n.j. Edition.26
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1328
April 2011
AF i g u r e s








    
02,6 02,6 02,6
Notes: The shaded area refers to the period after August 9, 2007 and the dashed
vertical line refers to the Lehman bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.
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Notes: As of October 15, 2008 the ECB changed the tender mechanism of its MROs
from a variable rate tender with a minimum bid rate to a ﬁxed rate full allotment
auction format. For further details, please refer to Figure A.1.27
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Notes: Prior to August 2007, the average outstanding volume associated with re-
ﬁnancing operations amounted to e 450 billions. This changed drastically in the
period after the Lehman bankruptcy. In the period from mid 2007 until June 2009,
the outstanding volume inclined to e 890 billions. For further details, please refer to
Figure A.1.
















Notes: For details, please refer to Figure A.128
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B Correlation Analysis
Table B.1: Correlation Analysis among Risk Measures
Pre-crisis Crisis
Corporate vs. VIX Corporate vs. VIX






























Notes: The pre-crisis sample runs from 10 March 2004 to 8 August 2007, and the crisis
sample ends in 30 June 2009. p-values are presented in parentheses.
Table B.1 presents the results from a Pearson covariance analysis. It shows that the interde-
pendence between the respective risk measures has signiﬁcantly changed since the start of the
ﬁnancial crisis. The signiﬁcant interaction among all variables indicates that it is not reasonable
to assume orthogonality between liquidity and credit risk measures. Thus, the OLS estimations of
β1, β2,a n dβ3 in Equation (1) will be subject to the issues related with imperfect multicollinear-
ity, i.e. large variances and small t-scores. In this case, testing the individual coefﬁcients one at
a time leads to unreliable results. In this respect, the F-statistic is a powerful tool to test the joint
impact of highly correlated variables.24 Table B.2 provides these test statistics and shows that our
risk variables jointly affect the Euribor rates along the 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month horizon.
As a result, excluding one of these risk components from the estimation equation would bear the
problem of omitted variables.
Table B.2: Wald Test of Joint Hypothesis
H0:β1 =0 ,β 2 =0 ,β 3 =0
Pre-crisis Crisis
ΔR(k) F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
k = 3-month 25.08 0.00 5.57 0.00
k = 6-month 247.89 0.00 3.03 0.02
k =12-month 245.60 0.00 12.11 0.00
24More precisely, the formula for the F-statistic adjusts for potential correlation so that, under the null
hypothesis with q restrictions, the F-statistic has an Fq,∞ distribution in large samples whether or not
t-statistics are correlated.30
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CU n i t R o o t T e s t s
This annex provides results regarding the co-integration properties of the data. Therefore, we
perform unit root tests on the Euribor and OIS rates for which the Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-
statistics are presented in Table C.1. For both the pre-crisis and crisis period, the Euribor and OIS
rates of all considered maturities have a unit root, i. e. are I(1), and should thus be treated as
non-stationary variables. To avoid the issues associated with non-stationarity, the Euribor and OIS
rates should be expressed in ﬁrst differences.
Table C.1: Unit-Root Tests
Variable ADF Test Variable ADF Test
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
R(3) -0.89 -1.24 ΔR(3) -24.34∗∗∗ -5.89∗∗∗
R(6) -1.15 -0.98 ΔR(6) -26.59∗∗∗ -7.35∗∗∗
R(12) -1.11 -0.74 ΔR(12) -28.33∗∗∗ -8.63∗∗∗
OIS(3) -1.29 -1.23 ΔOIS(3) -30.76∗∗∗ -6.87∗∗∗
OIS(6) -1.22 -0.90 ΔOIS(6) -31.58∗∗∗ -19.56∗∗∗
OIS(12) -1.21 -0.94 ΔOIS(12) -29.02∗∗∗ -21.50∗∗∗
Notes: ∗∗∗ denote the signiﬁcance at 1 % critical value. The t-statistic of
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests refer to the following test equation
with a constant, a linear trend and the lag length according to the Schwarz
Information Criterion. However, all results are robust against variation of the
lag length or the deterministics in the equation.31
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D Structural Break Test
This section uses structural break tests to investigate whether the period after August 9, 2007
signiﬁcantly changed the dynamics of Euribor rates. To that aim, the Chow breakpoint test is






+ γ CBt + δ Xt +
5
j=1 ϕjΔRt−j(k)+ t (2)
We divide our sample from March 10, 2004 to June 30, 2009 into two subsamples and test
whether there has been a break in all the equation parameters α, β, γ and ϕj as of August 9, 2007.
The Chow breakpoint test compares the sum of squared residuals obtained by ﬁtting equation (2)
to the entire sample with the sum of squared residuals obtained when separate equations are ﬁt
to each subsample. We report three test statistics for the Chow breakpoint test. The F-statistic
is based on the comparison of the restricted and unrestricted sum of squared residuals. The log
likelihood ratio statistic is based on the comparison of the restricted and unrestricted maximum of
the (Gaussian) log likelihood function. The Wald statistic is computed from a standard Wald test
of the restriction that the coefﬁcients on the equation parameters are the same in all subsamples.
While the F-statistic has an exact ﬁnite sample F-distribution, the LR and Wald test statistic have
both an asymptotic χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of parameters
in the equation.





















Notes: Speciﬁed break date and p-values in parenthesis. Subsamples: March
10, 2004 to August 8, 2007 and August 9, 2007 to June 30, 2009 for the daily
Euribor of three-month, six-month, and twelve-month horizon.
The results conﬁrm that the dynamics of Euribor rates have signiﬁcantly changed since mid
2007. Forall maturities, the test statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of no structural change
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